The news that 900 jobs are to go at the car parts maker Bosch in Wales arrives at the same time that Dame Peter Mandelson, our oxymoronic Business Secretary, has said some stern words regarding business taking a long term view to their UK operations.
Don't you get it yet Peter? Remember the old rhyme 'Sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me.' I am sure that you will always be able to point to what you have either said or not said in your defence but what have you done but fiddle whilst our manufacturing industry dies?
Showing posts with label motor industry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label motor industry. Show all posts
Friday, 15 January 2010
Tuesday, 28 July 2009
The Story of the Death of Rover.
Part 3 The English Were Patient.
After the fuss and media fun and games of the BMW ‘takeover’ there followed an anticlimax akin the ‘phoney war’, that period of apprehension followed by not much happening after news of the war was famously announced by Chamberlain on BBC radio: 'I have to tell you now,' he said, 'this country is at war with Germany.' At the time in 1939 people were expecting German troops to begin parachuting into towns and villages some dressed as nuns according to Dads Army. (I don’t recall the Rover board showing any of these episodes to the BMW board though).
We waited and waited but – no Germans and then there was the Road show. All Rover group employees took it in turns to be shipped out to the various Social Clubs with suitable sized halls which existed around the company. At Longbridge, there was a large assembly hall on site where all were gathered too see a car launch style presentation with dry ice, flashing lights and presentations which explained the plan. This was summed up by the road show theme tune, Two Hearts, One Mind by Phil Collins. The two companies were to operate as separate organisations, that was the two hearts bit. But what about the ‘one mind’? That question remained unanswered. Amongst the shop floor, suspicion began to grow that BMW, like so many other aspiring owners were only interested in a few gems such as 4 by 4 technology and getting their hands on some of the iconic brands owned by Rover such as Mini, Triumph, Riley, MG etc. Amongst management there was incredulity that a company like BMW would not take the sane business decision to take the economies of scale that would accrue when the two businesses were merged. Just like in Dads Army, the Germans still did not come.
During this Time John Towers remained as head of Rover but it was widely understood that BMW thought that he was too close a supporter of Honda and Japanese manufacturing techniques and BMW were not very impressed with these. Then someone made the decision to allow a documentary team exclusive and intrusive access to the company to make ‘When Rover Met BMW’. This was seen as a daft decision by many, even in the department which dealt with the press and media. It achieved very little for the two organisations but as they were completing their filming and had most of the series edited, John Towers announced his departure. This caused pandemonium amongst the film crew and they hastily shot some additional footage and included a scene where Wolfgang Reitzler , then BMW number two to Berndt Pischetsreider, made an announcement of which John Towers was completely in the dark. The implication of the documentary was that they had expected this to be the outcome all along. The documentary did show however that Dr Reitzler appeared to be a very ambitious person – to say the least.
I can understand why so many in the company felt that John Towers should be the man to lead the team to run Rover after BMW pulled out. He was at the top of the organisation before BMW came along, when Rover was making profits and their products were overcoming their reputation for poor quality and old fashioned design. He was head of the company for the first few years after BMW took over and it was only after he had gone that things seemed to take a turn for the worse. That was when the Germans finally did arrive.
What then followed was a great British car and a huge squabble between two senior BMW executives which nearlt did for both campanies.
After the fuss and media fun and games of the BMW ‘takeover’ there followed an anticlimax akin the ‘phoney war’, that period of apprehension followed by not much happening after news of the war was famously announced by Chamberlain on BBC radio: 'I have to tell you now,' he said, 'this country is at war with Germany.' At the time in 1939 people were expecting German troops to begin parachuting into towns and villages some dressed as nuns according to Dads Army. (I don’t recall the Rover board showing any of these episodes to the BMW board though).
We waited and waited but – no Germans and then there was the Road show. All Rover group employees took it in turns to be shipped out to the various Social Clubs with suitable sized halls which existed around the company. At Longbridge, there was a large assembly hall on site where all were gathered too see a car launch style presentation with dry ice, flashing lights and presentations which explained the plan. This was summed up by the road show theme tune, Two Hearts, One Mind by Phil Collins. The two companies were to operate as separate organisations, that was the two hearts bit. But what about the ‘one mind’? That question remained unanswered. Amongst the shop floor, suspicion began to grow that BMW, like so many other aspiring owners were only interested in a few gems such as 4 by 4 technology and getting their hands on some of the iconic brands owned by Rover such as Mini, Triumph, Riley, MG etc. Amongst management there was incredulity that a company like BMW would not take the sane business decision to take the economies of scale that would accrue when the two businesses were merged. Just like in Dads Army, the Germans still did not come.
During this Time John Towers remained as head of Rover but it was widely understood that BMW thought that he was too close a supporter of Honda and Japanese manufacturing techniques and BMW were not very impressed with these. Then someone made the decision to allow a documentary team exclusive and intrusive access to the company to make ‘When Rover Met BMW’. This was seen as a daft decision by many, even in the department which dealt with the press and media. It achieved very little for the two organisations but as they were completing their filming and had most of the series edited, John Towers announced his departure. This caused pandemonium amongst the film crew and they hastily shot some additional footage and included a scene where Wolfgang Reitzler , then BMW number two to Berndt Pischetsreider, made an announcement of which John Towers was completely in the dark. The implication of the documentary was that they had expected this to be the outcome all along. The documentary did show however that Dr Reitzler appeared to be a very ambitious person – to say the least.
I can understand why so many in the company felt that John Towers should be the man to lead the team to run Rover after BMW pulled out. He was at the top of the organisation before BMW came along, when Rover was making profits and their products were overcoming their reputation for poor quality and old fashioned design. He was head of the company for the first few years after BMW took over and it was only after he had gone that things seemed to take a turn for the worse. That was when the Germans finally did arrive.
What then followed was a great British car and a huge squabble between two senior BMW executives which nearlt did for both campanies.
Labels:
BMW,
david bailey,
Honda,
John towers,
longbridge,
motor industry,
Rover
Wednesday, 22 July 2009
Two Hearts, One Loser. Don't mention the war.
The story of the death of Rover.
Part 2. Don’t mention the war.
After BMW has taken the chance to inspect the books and view the new products under development, particularly the new style Range Rover and the Freelander, it was time for the new owners to take possession of their assets. Again, the workforce at Rover welcomed the opportunity to now be part of a successful motor company with a tradition of motoring excellence and a passion for ‘drivers cars’, the boss of BMW Berndt Pischetsrieder was a self proclaimed ‘petrol head’ and related to Sir Alec Isigonis developer of the famous Mini. Things were looking good for the future prospects of the company and there was a general good feeling throughout the plants at Longbridge, Cowley, Solihull and Swindon.
Everyone waited, it was quite a eyrie time, everyone was expecting changes, new initiatives, products, flags, badges and work wear; new letterheads, business cards, company livery and language lessons but as days turned into weeks nothing, the only noticeable event was that there were no longer any Japanese Honda technicians and a marked decline in those learning Japanese. People then started to fear the worst.
Because of my position, I was one of the few that had anything to do with personnel from BMW in the very early days. BMW workers and stakeholders also wanted to know about us so I hosted a number of teams from BMW communications department who were preparing articles for their various internal publications and annual report. They all seemed enthusiastic, committed and friendly, they were good to work with and very keen to find out about both our current status and particularly our long history because the Austin 7 formed the basis of the beginning of BMW.
Senior executives of both companies, it was assumed, were getting their heads around the task of welding these two great businesses into one larger and more successful company. The benefits were obvious; common parts sourcing, greater economies of scale, fewer head office functions and shared marketing and branding were some of the ways that would make the larger organisation more successful and competitive – everyone wins, except perhaps a few senior board members who’s positions would become superfluous when the two companies became one, Rover had, after all been taken over.
What was really taking place, though, beggars belief. Yes the two senior managements were meeting but the senior Rover team had convinced BMW executives that there was still a great deal of antipathy towards Germany in the UK, that they should not be seen as Jack-booting into Rover, a company much identified as part of the British heritage. They were shown episodes of ‘Allo ‘Allo and even the famous clip from Faulty Towers where John Cleese goose steps around the hotel and is advised by Connie ‘Don’t mention the war’. This was all embarrassing rubbish designed primarily to save the jobs of those making the presentation – but the Germans swallowed it.
The breathtaking self interest of the Rover senior executives was not wholly to blame however. It seems that there was a significant camp within BMW who were so worried about preserving the BMW badge that they also wanted to keep the two companies as separate entities, not to take advantages of the economies of scale, not to create one new larger, more competitive organisation and not to make BMW products in the Rover plants in the UK and vice versa.
These were the first of a series of, to say the least, extraordinary decisions by BMW but more were to come.
Part 2. Don’t mention the war.
After BMW has taken the chance to inspect the books and view the new products under development, particularly the new style Range Rover and the Freelander, it was time for the new owners to take possession of their assets. Again, the workforce at Rover welcomed the opportunity to now be part of a successful motor company with a tradition of motoring excellence and a passion for ‘drivers cars’, the boss of BMW Berndt Pischetsrieder was a self proclaimed ‘petrol head’ and related to Sir Alec Isigonis developer of the famous Mini. Things were looking good for the future prospects of the company and there was a general good feeling throughout the plants at Longbridge, Cowley, Solihull and Swindon.
Everyone waited, it was quite a eyrie time, everyone was expecting changes, new initiatives, products, flags, badges and work wear; new letterheads, business cards, company livery and language lessons but as days turned into weeks nothing, the only noticeable event was that there were no longer any Japanese Honda technicians and a marked decline in those learning Japanese. People then started to fear the worst.
Because of my position, I was one of the few that had anything to do with personnel from BMW in the very early days. BMW workers and stakeholders also wanted to know about us so I hosted a number of teams from BMW communications department who were preparing articles for their various internal publications and annual report. They all seemed enthusiastic, committed and friendly, they were good to work with and very keen to find out about both our current status and particularly our long history because the Austin 7 formed the basis of the beginning of BMW.
Senior executives of both companies, it was assumed, were getting their heads around the task of welding these two great businesses into one larger and more successful company. The benefits were obvious; common parts sourcing, greater economies of scale, fewer head office functions and shared marketing and branding were some of the ways that would make the larger organisation more successful and competitive – everyone wins, except perhaps a few senior board members who’s positions would become superfluous when the two companies became one, Rover had, after all been taken over.
What was really taking place, though, beggars belief. Yes the two senior managements were meeting but the senior Rover team had convinced BMW executives that there was still a great deal of antipathy towards Germany in the UK, that they should not be seen as Jack-booting into Rover, a company much identified as part of the British heritage. They were shown episodes of ‘Allo ‘Allo and even the famous clip from Faulty Towers where John Cleese goose steps around the hotel and is advised by Connie ‘Don’t mention the war’. This was all embarrassing rubbish designed primarily to save the jobs of those making the presentation – but the Germans swallowed it.
The breathtaking self interest of the Rover senior executives was not wholly to blame however. It seems that there was a significant camp within BMW who were so worried about preserving the BMW badge that they also wanted to keep the two companies as separate entities, not to take advantages of the economies of scale, not to create one new larger, more competitive organisation and not to make BMW products in the Rover plants in the UK and vice versa.
These were the first of a series of, to say the least, extraordinary decisions by BMW but more were to come.
Labels:
BMW,
david bailey,
Honda,
manufacturing,
motor industry,
Rover
Two Hearts, One Loser.
The story of the death of Rover.
Part 1. Honda betrayed.
Raking over the past may or may not have any relevance for the future but there are some aspects of the Rover story that have to be told. Everyone knows that Rover was once nationalised and was sold off to British Aerospace by the Thatcher government. It may not have been a great ‘fit’ but at least it conformed to the Thatcher dogma and removed the company from the government’s hands. The buzz amongst the workforce at the time was quite positive with many thinking that all this new aerospace technology could give Rover some competitive advantage with their new models – they were to be disappointed. Many of Rovers best managers were poached into BAe but no expertise flowed the other way.
Although many commentators like to characterise Rover by association with the bad old days of the sixties and seventies, by the time it was off-loaded to BAe it had been through significant changes. Its long association with Honda had brought new manufacturing techniques addressing quality issues and bringing new models and a new approach to working practices. Industrial relations had never been better and the company did not loose one day to industrial action in its last 25 years. Referring to it’s new owner, one very senior Rover executive after spending some time with BAe said, “It reminds me of British Leyland in the seventies”.
However, BAe having helped out Mrs T by taking the company off the government’s hands suddenly discovered that motor manufacture was not part of its core business and touted Rover for sale. Now, at that time Honda still had a 20% stake in the company, Rover also held a 20% stake in Honda UK and, naturally after many successful years of cooperation and collaboration Honda felt that they should be given some consideration and offered to increase their stake. At the same time BMW appeared on the scene. BMW were than seen a quite a small company and felt under threat from the giants of the industry, Mercedes being a nightmare threat for BMW as there was and still is no love lost between the two German companies. Buying Rover doubled the size and capacity of BMW over night. Honda management were furious and rightly felt that their long standing relationship with Rover had been ignored, they were also concerned because it exposed their technology and new products to a competitor. Serious and angry exchanges took place at board level between Rover and Honda.
It may seen strange to some that two, well respected names in the motor industry were squabbling over ownership of Rover but this was at a time when the automotive industry was in a period of significant growth and Rover made a £90 million profit during the year – it was no lame duck, a political football perhaps.
What happened next was quite extraordinary.
Part 1. Honda betrayed.
Raking over the past may or may not have any relevance for the future but there are some aspects of the Rover story that have to be told. Everyone knows that Rover was once nationalised and was sold off to British Aerospace by the Thatcher government. It may not have been a great ‘fit’ but at least it conformed to the Thatcher dogma and removed the company from the government’s hands. The buzz amongst the workforce at the time was quite positive with many thinking that all this new aerospace technology could give Rover some competitive advantage with their new models – they were to be disappointed. Many of Rovers best managers were poached into BAe but no expertise flowed the other way.
Although many commentators like to characterise Rover by association with the bad old days of the sixties and seventies, by the time it was off-loaded to BAe it had been through significant changes. Its long association with Honda had brought new manufacturing techniques addressing quality issues and bringing new models and a new approach to working practices. Industrial relations had never been better and the company did not loose one day to industrial action in its last 25 years. Referring to it’s new owner, one very senior Rover executive after spending some time with BAe said, “It reminds me of British Leyland in the seventies”.
However, BAe having helped out Mrs T by taking the company off the government’s hands suddenly discovered that motor manufacture was not part of its core business and touted Rover for sale. Now, at that time Honda still had a 20% stake in the company, Rover also held a 20% stake in Honda UK and, naturally after many successful years of cooperation and collaboration Honda felt that they should be given some consideration and offered to increase their stake. At the same time BMW appeared on the scene. BMW were than seen a quite a small company and felt under threat from the giants of the industry, Mercedes being a nightmare threat for BMW as there was and still is no love lost between the two German companies. Buying Rover doubled the size and capacity of BMW over night. Honda management were furious and rightly felt that their long standing relationship with Rover had been ignored, they were also concerned because it exposed their technology and new products to a competitor. Serious and angry exchanges took place at board level between Rover and Honda.
It may seen strange to some that two, well respected names in the motor industry were squabbling over ownership of Rover but this was at a time when the automotive industry was in a period of significant growth and Rover made a £90 million profit during the year – it was no lame duck, a political football perhaps.
What happened next was quite extraordinary.
Labels:
Automotive,
BMW,
Honda,
manufacturing,
motor industry,
Rover
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